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This paper seeks to provide a bridge between the theoretical and empirical literatures on 
interchange fees. Specifically, the paper confronts theory with practice by asking, to what extent 
do existing models of interchange fees match up with actual interchange fee practices in various 
countries? For each of four countries—Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—models that “best” fit the competitive and institutional features of that country’s 
payment card market are identified, and the implications of those models are compared to actual 
practices. Along what competitive dimensions is there alignment? Along what competitive 
dimensions is there not alignment? What country-specific factors appear to be important in 
explaining deviations from theoretical predictions? The results suggest that a theory applicable in 
one country may not be applicable in another, and that similar interchange fee arrangements and 
regulations may well have different implications in different countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
Interchange fees are an integral part of the pricing structure of credit and debit card 
industries. While in recent years the theoretical literature on interchange fees, and payment cards 
in general, has grown rapidly, the empirical literature has not. There are several reasons for this. 
First, comprehensive data are hard to obtain. Second, the industries are very complicated, and 
empirical models need to incorporate many industry-specific features, such as payment-card 
network rules and government regulations. And third, empirical studies may require a 
generalized empirical model since, typically, only a few payment card networks exist in a given 
country. However, because of the first and second reasons, generalizing empirical models may 
prove problematic.  
This paper seeks to provide a bridge between the theoretical and empirical literatures on 
interchange fees. Specifically, the paper confronts theory with practice by asking, to what extent 
do existing models of interchange fees match up with actual interchange fee practices in various 
countries? For each of four countries—Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United 
States—models that “best” fit the competitive and institutional features of that country’s 
payment card market are identified, and the implications of those model are compared to actual 
practices. Along what competitive dimensions is there alignment? Along what competitive 
dimensions is there not alignment? What country-specific factors appear to be important in 
explaining deviations from theoretical predictions? The results suggest that a theory applicable in 
one country may not be applicable in another, and that similar interchange fee arrangements and 
regulations may well have different implications in different countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, which draws extensively from Weiner and 
Wright (2005), provides an overview of interchange fee developments and issues in ten key  
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countries and areas: Australia, Canada, Denmark, EU cross-border, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. Credit card, signature-based debit card, and PIN-
based debit card markets are addressed separately. Topics covered include interchange fee 
arrangements and regulations, network rules, recent and current controversies, and the role of 
public authorities. Section 3 of the paper surveys existing theories of interchange fees. The 
discussion is focused on assumptions regarding the degree of network competition, the degree of 
intra-network (issuing and acquiring) competition, and the behavior of consumers and 
merchants. Section 4 of the paper then attempts to match the reality of Section 2 with the theory 
of Section 3 by examining in some detail interchange fee developments in four particularly 
interesting markets: Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. These case studies 
provide useful insight into interchange fee competition issues. Finally, Section 5 offers a 
summary. 
2.  Interchange Fee Arrangements 
Credit and debit card industries are examples of two-sided markets. The distinguishing 
feature of two-sided markets is they contain two sets of end users, each of whom needs the other 
in order for the market to operate. In the case of credit and debit cards, the two end-user groups 
are cardholders and merchants.  
Payment card systems take one of two principal forms. They may be three-party systems: 
cardholders, merchants, and a single financial institution that offers proprietary network services, 
for example, American Express. Alternatively, they may be four-party systems: cardholders, 
merchants, card-issuing banks, and merchant acquiring banks, using the services of a multi-party 
network such as MasterCard, Visa, or a domestic debit card network. In four-party systems, the 
interchange fee is an instrument that networks can use to achieve a desired balance of cardholder  
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usage versus merchant acceptance across the two sides of the market, in the same way that 
proprietary systems can do so directly. In other words, interchange fees are a mechanism that can 
be used to transfer revenues from one side of the market to the other in order to generate the 
desired level of card activity. 
Interchange fee arrangements vary considerably across countries. This section of the 
paper documents these arrangements, as well as related developments and issues, in the 
following countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, EU cross-border, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. These countries share some common features but 
also exhibit many differences in how interchange and related fees and rules operate in their 
respective markets. In all of these countries, however, interchange fees currently are, to varying 
degrees, the focus of pointed industry and public-authority debate.
1 
The section is organized as follows. The first three subsections discuss developments and 
issues in the credit, signature-based debit, and PIN-based debit card markets separately. The 
discussion is guided by information presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In these tables, 
the ten individual countries and areas are listed as rows and, for each, key interchange-related 
information is provided in the columns: instrument market share (column 3); networks operating 
in that country (column 4); what bodies set interchange fees for those networks (column 5); 
recent movements in interchange fees (column 6); recent movements in merchant service charges 
(column 7); recent movements in cardholder fees (column 8); whether no-surcharge (column 9), 
honor-all-cards (column 10), net-issuer (column 11), and duality/exclusion rules (column 12) are 
in force in various networks; and finally, interchange-rated issues and controversies recently or 
currently under debate (column 13). The closing subsection delves more deeply into public  
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authority involvement in interchange discussions, documenting, with the aid of Table 4, actions 
and rulings taken by or pending before competition authorities and central banks in these ten 
countries. 
2.1 Credit cards 
Credit cards are an important payment instrument in many of the countries under review.
2 
As noted in column 3 of Table 1, they are most prominent, in terms of share of overall noncash 
transactions volume, in Canada, the United States, Australia, the UK, and Spain.
3 Column 4 
shows the credit card networks operating in the ten countries and areas. Four-party networks are 
listed above the dotted line while three-party networks are listed below the dotted line. Networks 
with an asterisk behind them are networks available for international use only, that is, networks 
that issue cards to that country’s residents for international use and are available for foreigner’s 
use within the country. Another convention followed in Tables 1 through 3 relates to missing 
information. When a statement or attribute is not attached to a specific network, it can be taken 
to hold for all networks in that country. When a statement or attribute is attached to a specific 
network, it applies only to that network, and comparable information not shown for other 
networks means that such information is not available. Finally, in the tables, “nap” denotes not 
applicable, and “neg” denotes negligible. 
Interchange fees are set under a variety of arrangements (column 5). In some countries 
they are collectively set by members of the network, sometimes subject to regulatory limits; in 
others they are set by network management; in one country, Mexico, they are set by members of 
the Mexican Bankers Association; and in another, Sweden, they are set bilaterally. In Demark, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1For institutional background on the payments card industry in various countries, see Bank for International 
Settlements (2003), European Central Bank (2001), Evans and Schmalensee (2005a), and Hayashi, Sullivan, and 
Weiner (2003). 
2“Credit cards” includes charge cards as well as deferred debit transactions.  
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interchange fees are aligned with merchant service charges, which are subject to a regulatory 
cap.
4 
In most countries interchange fees have declined or are declining (column 6). In some 
countries, this is due to recent regulation or regulatory threat: Australia, Mexico, and EU cross-
border. In Spain, interchange fees have been declining as a result of a 1999 agreement among 
banks, networks, merchants, and the Ministry of the Economy.
5 A notable outlier is the United 
States, where interchange fees on credit cards have been rising in recent years. 
Although difficult to document, merchant service charge movements appear to have 
tracked interchange fee movements to some extent (column 7). Cardholder fee movements have 
also tended to move in the expected direction (column 8). In countries where interchange fees 
have declined, for example, Australia and Spain, annual fees have increased and, in the case of 
Australia, interest-free periods have shortened and rewards programs have become less generous. 
In the United States, where interchange fees have risen, annual fees have declined, reward 
programs have become more generous, and zero introductory interest rates have become 
prevalent. Here the UK appears to be something of an outlier, with interchange fees falling but 
annual-fee and introductory-rate provisions remaining relatively generous. 
The ten countries/areas exhibit considerable variation across the principal categories of 
network rules: no-surcharge rules, honor-all-cards (HAC) rules, net issuer rules, and 
duality/exclusion rules. No-surcharge rules prevent merchants from charging customers for the 
use of a particular payment mechanism, in this case, a credit card. Honor-all-card rules, as 
defined here, require merchants that accept a network’s credit card to also accept that network’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
3In Spain, charge card transactions are predominant.  
4In addition, in many countries, MasterCard members are permitted to negotiate interchange fees bilaterally. 
5A further lowering of fees may result from an April 2005 ruling by the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia.  
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signature-based debit card, if the latter exists in a given country.
6 Net issuer rules require 
acquiring banks to issue a minimum level of cards in order to participate on the acquiring side of 
the market. Duality rules allow a bank that issues MasterCard credit cards to also issue Visa 
credit cards. Finally, exclusion rules prevent a bank that issues MasterCard or Visa credit cards 
from issuing other credit cards, for example, American Express and Discover. 
No-surcharge rules are presently in effect in Canada, Mexico, the United States, and 
Sweden (column 9). They also are in effect—for Visa—for EU cross-border and Spanish 
transactions. On the other hand, surcharging is permitted in Australia, the Netherlands, and the 
UK and, for MasterCard, also in Spain and EU cross-border.
7 
Honor-all-card rules have a particularly interesting history in the United States (column 
10). The so-called Wal-Mart case, brought by several merchants and trade associations against 
Visa and MasterCard in the mid-1990s and finally settled in 2003, eliminated Visa and 
MasterCard HAC rules. Net issuer rules are in place in roughly half of the countries under 
review (column 11). Duality is allowed in all countries but Canada; exclusion rules vary (column 
12). 
Turning to the last column of Table 1, industry participants and public authorities in 
virtually all of the countries have dealt with or are currently discussing issues and controversies 
surrounding credit card interchange fees and related matters. These range from regulations or 
agreements lowering interchange fees (Australia, Mexico, EU cross-border) or capping merchant 
service charges (Denmark), to regulations eliminating or permitting no-surcharge rules 
                                                 
6In Europe, the term “honor-all-cards rule” is typically defined differently, namely, if a merchant accepts a 
MasterCard\Visa-branded credit card issued by Bank A, the merchant must also accept a MasterCard\Visa-branded 
credit card issued by Bank B and, similarly, if a merchant accepts a MasterCard\Visa-branded PIN debit card issued 
by Bank A, the merchant must also accept a MasterCard/Visa-branded PIN debit card issued by Bank B. Thus, in 
Europe, honor-all-cards rules typically do not tie debit cards to credit cards. 
7Although MasterCard allows surcharging in Spain, the three domestic card networks do not.  
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(Australia, EU cross-border), to merchant dissatisfaction with interchange levels (United States, 
Spain, EU cross-border, UK), to complaints or concerns over three-party network schemes 
(Australia, United States), transparency (Spain, EU cross-border, Australia), and duality 
(Canada). Thus, there is no shortage of challenging issues confronting the industry. 
2.2  Signature-based debit cards 
Table 2 presents information on signature-based debit cards. Signature-based cards have 
an important presence in a few countries, for example, the United States and Spain, and in other 
countries, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, they are essentially nonexistent (column 3). 
As the name suggests, they are debit cards that require a signature, not a PIN, for authorization. 
MasterCard and Visa signature debit transactions run over MasterCard’s and Visa’s respective 
credit card networks. The three Spanish signature debit card networks, Euro 6000, ServiRed, and 
Sistema 4B, are stand-alone proprietary systems.
8 
In this subsection and the next, to keep things a little simpler, the general terms 
“MasterCard” and “Visa” are used to denote the various MasterCard and Visa signature and PIN-
based debit products. Thus, Visa CheckCard (United States signature), Visa Debit (Australian 
signature), Visa Electron (European PIN), and Visa Interlink (United States PIN) are all referred 
to as Visa, while MasterCard MasterMoney (United States signature) and MasterCard Maestro 
(worldwide PIN) are all referred to as MasterCard. 
As is the case with credit cards, interchange fees on signature debit have tended to 
decline in recent years (column 6), often attributable to regulatory action (EU cross-border), 
regulatory threat (Mexico), or government-led industry agreement (Spain). Interchange fees on 
U.S. signature debit, in contrast, have taken a different route. As part of the Wal-Mart settlement, 
                                                 
8These networks also process MasterCard and Visa credit card and debit card transactions.  
  9
they were reduced by roughly a third over the period August to December 2003, but since that 
time they have risen to some extent.
9 Merchant service charges appear, for the most part, to have 
moved in the same direction as interchange fees, although, like cardholder fee movements, 
complete data are hard to obtain (columns 7, 8). 
Typically, signature-based debit transactions are subject to the same no-surcharge rules as 
credit cards in the various countries, and by definition, all honor-all-cards rules are also the same 
(columns 9, 10). Net issuer and duality rules also coincide (columns 11, 12). 
A number of signature debit issues are currently under discussion (column 13). In 
Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia has proposed lowering interchange fees and eliminating 
the no-surcharge and HAC rules on the Visa signature card. In the United States, there is 
widespread merchant dissatisfaction with the level of interchange fees, and in Spain some 
merchants reportedly believe merchant service charges remain too high. The EC, meanwhile, has 
MasterCard’s fee policy under review, having reached an earlier agreement with Visa for Visa to 
lower its cross-border fees. 
2.3 PIN-based debit cards 
Table 3 presents information on PIN-based debit cards. PIN-based cards have a large 
presence in many European countries as well as in Canada, Australia, and the United States 
(column 4). MasterCard and Visa operate PIN-based systems in several of these countries; in 
addition, domestic systems are especially prominent in Australia, Canada, the United States, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands (column 4).
10 
                                                 
9After rising in 2004, some signature-based debit interchange fees were lowered in April 2005. Most remain above 
post-settlement levels, however. 
10In many cases, MasterCard and Visa PIN-based debit cards are co-branded with domestic schemes, and routing 
priority is given to the latter.  
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PIN-based networks display a variety of institutional features and practices across 
countries. In Australia, for example, EFTPOS PIN debit interchange fees are set bilaterally and, 
notably, are paid by the issuer to the acquirer. In Canada and the Netherlands, interchange fees 
are set at zero by Interac and Interpay, respectively. Swedish PIN interchange fees are negotiated 
bilaterally. And in the United States, PIN debit interchange fees are often a competitive tool for 
attracting issuers—the United States is characterized by a large number of good-sized domestic 
networks, the largest of which (Star, NYCE, and Pulse) compete vigorously with Visa (columns 
4, 5). 
Interchange fee movements have shown varying patterns in recent years (column 6). 
They have remained at zero in Canada and the Netherlands and have been stable in Australia. In 
Denmark, MasterCard and Visa fees have declined, while positive fees for Dankort transactions 
(the domestic network) were introduced at the beginning of this year but have since been 
eliminated again, all due to regulatory actions.
11 In the United States, PIN debit interchange fees 
have been drifting up. 
As with credit cards and signature debit, a number of PIN debit issues are currently under 
discussion (column 13). The Reserve Bank of Australia has proposed lowering EFTPOS 
interchange fees. The EC is reviewing MasterCard’s cross-border interchange fees. In Canada, 
cards from participating issuers can now be used at U.S. merchants who belong to the NYCE 
network. In the United States, merchants are dissatisfied with rising interchange fees; the United 
States has seen a striking consolidation of domestic networks in recent years, the outcome of 
which is still unclear. In the Netherlands, the Competition Authority recently fined Interpay for 
its pricing policies, although the objection process is still underway. And in Denmark, since 
March 1 of this year, surcharging has been eliminated on Dankort transactions.  
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2.4 Public authority involvement 
Virtually all central banks have general oversight responsibility for the payments systems 
of their respective countries and areas. Explicitly or implicitly, most have a mandate to ensure 
that payments systems operate safely and efficiently. As retail payments systems around the 
globe migrate from paper to electronics—and, in particular, as credit and especially debit card 
transactions become a dominant form of payment—central banks are paying increasing attention 
to credit and debit card industries. 
In most countries, however, specific interchange fee and other payment competition 
issues fall under the jurisdiction of competition (regulatory and antitrust) authorities. There are 
exceptions, of course: the Reserve Bank of Australia and Banco de Mexico have been very 
visible in interchange matters. And the Banco de Espana plays an important monitoring role. But 
for the most part, it is the competition authorities that have taken the lead in evaluating and, at 
times, bringing about change, in credit and debit card markets. For the set of countries under 
review in this paper, this is true of Canada, the United States, EU cross-border, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
Turning to specifics, Table 4 documents various actions taken by and pending before 
public authorities on interchange and related issues. Beginning with Australia, in early 2003, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) eliminated credit card no-surcharge rules, and later that year 
mandated that credit card interchange fees be lowered. Early this year, it ruled that payments 
between American Express and Diners Club and their bank partners will not be regulated but that 
the two companies will reword certain restrictive clauses in their merchant agreements. 
American Express and Diners Club are now publishing their average merchant service fees; 
Bankcard, MasterCard, and Visa have been required to publish interchange fees since 2003. 
                                                                                                                                                             
11A further review of Dankort fees is possible by summer 2005.  
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Pending issues include RBA proposals to lower EFTPOS PIN debit interchange fees and 
Visa signature debit interchange fees. The RBA also has proposed eliminating the honor-all-
cards rule (HAC) linking Visa’s credit and signature debit cards. The Bank will review existing 
regulations for credit card schemes in 2007. 
The Banco de Mexico is the other central bank that has taken a prominent role in 
addressing credit and debit card issues. It has been working with the Mexican Bankers 
Association to lower interchange fees and make the HAC rule more flexible. 
Among competition authorities, the European Commission in 2001 came to an agreement 
with Visa whereby Visa agreed to gradually reduce its cross-border interchange fees on credit 
cards and signature and PIN debit cards by December 2007. At the same time, Visa was 
permitted to keep its no-surcharge, HAC, and net issuer rules. Currently pending are EC 
investigations of MasterCard cross-border interchange fees and exclusion provisions in Visa 
membership rules. 
In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) ruled in September 2005 that the 2000-2004 
MasterCard multilateral credit card interchange fee agreements were anti-competitive; 
MasterCard is currently appealing this decision. In October 2005, the OFT issued a statement of 
objections against Visa’s domestic multilateral interchange fee agreements for its credit, deferred 
debit, and charge card transactions. A period of discussion is currently underway. 
Competition authorities have been active elsewhere as well. Last year, the Netherlands 
Competition Authority (NMa) fined Interpay and its member banks for charging “excessive” 
merchant service charges, although the objection process is still underway. Also last year, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Department of Justice’s successful 2001 court case 
eliminating MasterCard and Visa exclusion rules that prohibited member banks from issuing  
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American Express and Discover credit cards. Earlier actions or agreements in other countries 
include: (i) the Danish Competition Authority’s administration of the 2003 Amendment to the 
Danish Act on Certain Payments, whereby MasterCard and Visa PIN debit merchant service 
charges were reduced and a positive (non-zero) interchange fee was introduced on Dankort chip 
PIN debit card transactions; (ii) the Canadian Competition Authority’s mid-90’s Consent 
Agreement with the principal member of Interac, which resulted in expanded representation on 
the Board, liberalization of network access rules, and removal of constraints on product 
innovation and price competition, including the removal of the prohibition against surcharging; 
and (iii) the Spanish Ministry of the Economy’s 1999 agreement with banks, networks, and 
merchants to lower credit card and signature debit card interchange fees, and the Tribunal’s 2005 
request to the networks for new interchange fee setting procedures.  
Interaction among competition authorities and central banks on credit and debit card 
issues varies across countries (column 9). In some countries, there is some degree of consultation 
and occasional representation on joint task forces—this is, or has been, true in Spain, the EC, the 
UK, and Australia, for example. In other countries, the degree of interaction between 
competition authority and central bank appears limited, at least formally. Whether closer ties will 
be forged in light of the issues facing the card industry bears watching. 
3.  Interchange Fee Theories 
Interchange fees and related payment card issues have been the subject of a growing body 
of theoretical work in recent years.
12 This section of the paper surveys a portion of this work, 
focusing on models that examine various factors potentially affecting interchange fees. In order 
                                                 
12Other surveys are provided by Schmalensee (2003), Evans and Schmalensee (2005b), Roson (2005), and Weiner 
and Wright (2005).  
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to review this literature somewhat systematically, we group possible factors into four categories: 
assumptions regarding networks, assumptions regarding issuers and acquirers, assumptions 
regarding end-users (consumers and merchants), and assumptions regarding other possible 
factors. A single factor, by itself, is highly unlikely to determine the level of interchange fees. 
Rather, interaction among factors, in some or all of these four categories, typically proves 
critical. 
3.1  Assumptions  
Table 5 presents a summary of many of the key theoretical articles on interchange fees 
written over the last several years. The papers, organized by the assumed level of network and 
intra-network (issuer and acquirer) competition, are listed in the third column of the table. As 
will be discussed in Section 4 below, use of these two categories proves to be a useful “first-
step” sorting mechanism when comparing model assumptions and predictions with actual 
interchange fee arrangements. 
The first organizational division, reflected in the first column of Table 5, is the 
assumption regarding network competition. Many models assume there is no competition among 
card networks, either explicitly, by assuming a monopolistic network, or implicitly, by not 
considering network competition in the setup. Other models assume there is competition among 
networks. In some cases, these networks are defined as identical, competing within the same 
payment instrument (for example, credit vs. credit or debit vs. debit). In other cases, these 
networks are defined as asymmetric, competing across different payment instruments (for 
example, credit vs. debit or PIN debit vs. signature debit), across different network schemes 
(three-party vs. four-party), or within the same payment instrument but facing different cost 
structures.  
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The second organizational division, shown in the second column of Table 5, is the 
assumption regarding intra-network competition. A key feature of most models is the assumed 
degree of competition among card-issuing banks and among merchant acquiring banks. This 
degree of competition is typically modeled with reference to the price-cost margins of issuers 
and acquirers. A zero margin is taken to imply perfect competition. A positive margin is taken to 
imply some market power. As seen in Table 5, some models assume both issuers and acquirers 
operate in perfectly competitive markets, some assume both issuers and acquirers have some 
market power, and still others assume only issuers have market power. 
The remaining “Assumption” columns in Table 5 list other important factors assumed or 
incorporated in the respective models. Column 4 focuses on network attributes. In addition to the 
assumed degree of network competition, three additional network attributes are considered: 
whether the model in question assumes a three-party or four-party scheme; what the network(s)’ 
objectives are; and whether there is a single or multiple interchange fee structure. Possible 
network objectives include maximizing the number of transactions or market share; maximizing 
network profits (in a three-party scheme); and maximizing members’ joint profits (in a four-party 
scheme), perhaps weighted more on the issuer or acquirer side. In addition, networks may seek to 
address any imbalances between the costs and revenues of issuers and acquirers, and between the 
demand of consumers and merchants. Finally, models may incorporate either a single 
interchange fee or, alternatively, multiple interchange fees that vary according to type of industry 
or transaction volume. 
Column 5 in Table 5 focuses on intra-network attributes. In addition to the assumed 
degree of competition on the issuing and acquiring sides of the market, three additional attributes 
are considered: the degree of pass-through of interchange fees from issuers and acquirers to  
  16
cardholders and merchants, respectively; the relative cost structures facing issues and acquirers; 
and whether issuers and acquirers are the same or different entities. 
The next two columns turn to assumptions regarding the end users in payment card 
models. Consumer characteristics (column 6) include the demand for products (elastic or 
inelastic); the demand for cards (exogenous or endogenous; singlehoming or multihoming); and 
the demand for specific card transactions (homogeneous or heterogeneous transactional 
benefits). The types of fees and rewards that consumers face also vary by model. 
Merchant characteristics are listed in column 7. Some models assume that merchants are 
strategic in their card-acceptance behavior, that is, they are competitive. Others assume that 
merchants are monopolistic. Models also differ according to whether merchants are assumed to 
derive homogeneous or heterogeneous transactional benefits, and whether they pay per-
transaction fees and/or fixed fees. Finally, column 8 shows other factors that are built into 
various models. Chief among them are the presence or absence of assorted network rules and 
bylaws. These include no-surcharge and non-discrimination rules, honor all cards rules, and net 
issuer rules. 
3.2  Results 
It is probably fair to say that the results of the papers summarized in Table 5 vary as 
much or more as the underlying assumptions in these papers. Key results are listed in column 9. 
Perhaps the most important general result involves network competition. The effect of 
network competition on interchange fees is not uniform but varies widely depending on other 
factors. Some key factors include consumer and merchant demand characteristics, and the nature 
of intra-system competition.  
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To the extent consumers are singlehoming, that is, use only one payment card, networks 
can act as monopolies, so interchange fees are not reduced by network competition (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2002). However, as consumers become multihoming, merchant resistance to interchange 
fees increases, and network competition lowers interchange fees (Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003; 
Guthrie and Wright, 2003). 
To the extent that merchants are homogeneous, with an inelastic demand for transactions, 
network competition leads to a lower (or equal) interchange fee than non-competition. However, 
if merchants are heterogeneous (elastic demand), the competitive interchange fee can be higher 
than the monopolistic interchange fee (Guthrie and Wright, 2005). Network competition lowers 
interchange fees for both strategic (competitive) and monopolistic merchants. However, 
interchange fees for monopolistic merchants are lower than those for strategic merchants whether 
the network is competitive or not (Guthrie and Wright, 2003). 
Intra-system competition is similarly influential. Several models show that differences in 
issuers’ and acquirers’ margins affect equilibrium interchange fees (Maneti and Somma, 2002; 
Rochet and Tirole, 2002; and Guthrie and Wright, 2005). Differences in these margins also affect 
competing networks’ profits (Maneti and Somma, 2002). 
A number of other interesting results involving network competition fall out of these 
models as well. These include: (1) network competition lowers the total fees charged across the 
issuing and acquring sides of the market (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; and Chakravorti and Roson, 
2004); (2) network competition may raise interchange fees if consumers hold a single card and 
merchant demand for transactions is elastic (Guthrie and Wright, 2003, 2005); and (3) if the 
network is a monopoly, interchange fees can vary depending on the interaction of network  
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objectives and issuer and acquirer margins (Gans and King, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 
2003, 2004; and Schwartz and Vincent, 2004).  
Clearly, the nature of network competition is central to many of the results of the models 
in Table 5. Another important role is played by the various network rules and bylaws. Most of 
the models, for example, explicitly assume a no-surcharge rule and implicitly assume an honor 
all cards rule. Relaxing these assumptions can lead to differing results. If merchants are allowed 
to surcharge, for example, interchange fee levels may change depending on any number of 
additional factors, including the effective cost of surcharging to merchants, merchant 
competitiveness, and the price elasticity of consumer demand for goods (Gans and King, 2002; 
Katz, 2001; Wright, 2003; and Schwartz and Vincent, 2004). 
What one comes away with after surveying this rich theoretical literature is an 
appreciation for the many factors that may affect interchange fees. Even a single factor may 
impact interchange fees differently depending on other factors. Determining the actual impact of 
such variables is, in the end, an empirical question. We attempt to take a step in this direction in 
the next section. 
4.  Country Case Studies 
The previous section surveyed some of the important contributions in the theoretical 
literature on payment card interchange fees. This section details actual market conditions in four 
countries—the United States, Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands—and compares these 
conditions with theory. The key question asked is, to what extent do actual interchange fee 
practices “line up” with model assumptions and predictions? For each country, we first 
characterize the credit and debit card industries by the level of network and intra-network  
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competition. We then try to match up a country’s experience with existing theory, suggesting 
additional assumptions and institutional features that may help explain that country’s situation. 
4.1 United States 
4.1.1 Network  competition 
Network competition exists in the United States, both within and across payment card 
instruments. 
The United States has six credit card networks. The three largest—Visa, MasterCard, and 
American Express—compete aggressively with one another. Visa has the largest market share, 
followed by MasterCard and American Express. Visa’s market share has declined somewhat in 
recent years, as measured by purchase value, number of transactions, and number of cards (Chart 
1). The remaining three credit card networks—Discover, Diners Club, and JCB, have relatively 
small market shares (Chart 1). 
The United States has two signature-based debit card networks (Visa Check Card and 
MasterCard MasterMoney) and thirteen PIN-based debit card networks. Competition has been 
especially pronounced in the PIN debit market, and especially among the four largest networks. 
The market share of Visa’s Interlink network has trended up in recent years while those for Star, 
NYCE, and Pulse have fluctuated (Chart 2). These large PIN-based networks also compete 
vigorously with the two signature-based networks.
13 
It is unclear to what extent credit cards and debit cards compete. Overall debit card 
market share (signature plus PIN) has been rising in recent years, and in 2003, the number of 
debit card transactions exceeded the number of credit card transactions for the first time (Chart 
3). However, in terms of purchase value, the difference between credit cards and debit cards has 
                                                 
13For discussion of PIN vs signature debit competition, see Hayashi et.al (2003).  
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been stable over the last five years, suggesting perhaps that debit card transactions are largely 
substituting for paper-based (check and cash) transactions and not for credit card transactions 
(Chart 3). One can safely say, however, that there is competition within the credit card industry, 
within the PIN debit card industry, and across the PIN and signature debit card industries. 
4.1.2 Intra-network  competition 
Both the acquiring and issuing sides of the card market appear to be competitive in the 
United States. 
With regard to the acquiring market, although the largest acquirers’ market share has 
increased slightly in the last ten years, acquirers’ margins per transaction reportedly have been 
declining (Chart 4).
14 
On the issuing side, top credit card issuers’ market shares have increased significantly in 
the last ten years (Chart 5). Nevertheless, this market appears to be quite competitive. No annual 
fees, generous reward programs, and free or low introductory interest rates are typical in the 
industry, as issuers compete aggressively for customers. The story is somewhat different with 
respect to debit cards. Here, market shares of top issuers are much smaller than in the credit card 
market (Chart 6, 7), but the degree of competition is hard to gauge. Because debit cards are tied 
to demand deposit accounts, it is costly for consumers to switch issuers. At the same time, 
however, many banks use their debit products as a strategic tool, providing rewards for signature 
card transactions and charging so-called PIN fees for PIN card transactions. On net, it is 
probably fair to view card issuing—both credit and debit—as a competitive environment. 
                                                 
14According to the Star’s fee structure, a processing fee is around 3 cents per transaction and according to the FMI, 
the acquirer’s processing charge is between 2.5 cents to 6.5 cents per transactions, these fees have declined slightly 
in the last several years.   
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4.1.3  Matching theory and practice 
As noted above, both network and intra-network payment card competition exists in the 
United States. In terms of network competition, competition between Visa and MasterCard in the 
credit card market, and among the top networks in the PIN debit market, fit well with the 
identical four-party network schemes assumed in Guthrie and Wright(2003, 2005) and Rochet 
and Tirole (2002, 2003). Competition between Visa/MasterCard and American Express, on the 
other hand, fits well with Maneti and Somma (2002). 
In terms of intra-network competition, although both the acquiring and issuing sides of 
market are competitive, it is difficult to judge which side is more competitive or which side 
experiences lower margins per transaction. Revenues (not margins) are much higher for issuers 
than acquirers, but their costs per transaction are unknown. It does appear that pass-through of 




On balance, network objectives are likely to be weighted more heavily toward issuers 
than acquirers in the U.S. One reason is that even the largest nonbank acquirers do not have 
voting power in association networks and market share of nonbank acquirers is fairly large 
(Chart 8). A second reason is that large bank acquirers are typically large issuers as well (Table 
6). Therefore, maximization of issuer profits, number of transactions, or the weighted sum of 
end-user surplus (with a high weight on consumers) appears to be plausible assumptions in the 
U.S. case. These assumptions are made by Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2005) and Rochet and 
Tirole (2002, 2003). 
                                                 
15A typical merchant fee consists of three components, an interchange fee (to the issuer), a processing fee (to the 
acquirer), and a switch fee (to the network).  
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Other important factors in the United States are merchant demand for card transactions 
and consumer cardholding behavior. Most industries in the United States are quite competitive. 
As a result, merchants clearly have a strategic motive to accept cards. In addition, unlike in most 
other countries, interchange fees in the United States are set in a very detailed manner according 
to industry category (Table 7). Thus, a single interchange fee applies to a relatively 
homogeneous set of merchants, and this industry-specific fee less likely impacts consumer 
cardholding behavior, which is consistent with Rochet and Tirole (2002). U.S. households 
typically hold multiple credit and debit cards, that is, they are multihoming.
17 However, also 
consistent with Rochet and Tirole (2002), these multihoming cardholders often appear to prefer a 
particular card over the others.
18 
Taken in sum, the assumptions in Rochet and Tirole (2002) fit the U.S. payment card 
market well. However, the model does not predict that network competition raises interchange 
fees, which, arguably, is what is being observed in the United States. The model also predicts 
that competition among issuers lowers interchange fees, which also seems to contradict the U.S. 
case (Chart 9). The only model that predicts that network competition may raise interchange fees 
is Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2005). However, to generate this result, the model assumes that 
heterogeneous merchants face a single interchange fee, which is not the case in the United States. 
Can theory and fact be reconciled? Additional considerations may help explain the U.S. 
situation. For example, modeling issuers’ behavior may prove critical. Oligopolistic issuers may 
alter their card portfolio, if not change networks, according to profitability. Network competition, 
                                                                                                                                                             
16According to a large credit card issuer’s annual report, the average growth rate of interchange fee income (after 
deducted the costs of reward program) exceeds the average growth rate of transaction value. This suggests that 
interchange fee does not pass-through 100 percent on issuing side. 
17According to the BIS, the number of debit cards and credit cards issued in the U.S. in 2002 were 260.4 million and 
709 million, respectively. The U.S. population in the same year was 288.2 million.  
18Some studies pointed out this. For example, the 2004 Preferred Card Study by Edgar, Dunn, and Company 
concluded that “rewards dominate the reasons to use a specific credit card for 6 in 10 Americans.”  
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therefore, gives networks a strong incentive to try to attract issuers as much as possible. One of 
the strategies for doing so is to provide issuers with higher interchange fees. Per-transaction costs 
for issuers may not be fixed, as many papers assume, but rather be endogenous with respect to 
interchange fees. Higher interchange fees allow issuers to provide more generous reward 
programs to cardholders, but of course reward programs are costly. 
As noted, U.S. interchange fees are set by industry. As a result, modeling consumer 
cardholding and merchant card acceptance under a single interchange fee does not fit the U.S. 
case. In a given industry, perhaps the merchant’s card acceptance does not influence their 
customers’ cardholding behavior. 
4.2 Australia 
4.2.1  Network competition 
Network competition likely exists in Australia. 
There are six credit card networks in the country. The three largest—Visa, MasterCard, 
and Bankcard—have a combined market share in excess of 80 percent. The remaining market is 
divided among American Express, Diners Club, and JCB. Individual network share data are not 
available for recent years, but in 2001-2002, shares in terms of number of credit cards were 53.4 
percent for Visa, 22.7 percent for MasterCard, 15.4 percent for Bankcard, 6.5 percent for 
American Express, 1.9 percent for Diners, and essentially negligible for JCB. Over the 2002 to 
2005 period, the combined American Express/Diners share has increased slightly (Chart 10). 
There are two debit card networks in Australia, EFTPOS and Visa Debit. EFTPOS is 
PIN-based, while Visa Debit is signature-based. Based on statistics furnished by the Building 
Society to the Reserve Bank of Australia, EFTPOS’s share of the overall debit network is  
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roughly 90 percent while Visa Debit’s is roughly 10 percent.
19 Visa Debit cards are primarily 
issued by credit unions and building societies that were precluded from issuing credit cards. 
EFTPOS cards, in contrast, are issued by all types of financial institutions. 
Credit card and EFTPOS debit card transactions have exhibited an interesting growth 
pattern in recent ten years (Chart 11). In 1995, credit and EFTPOS debit transaction volume were 
about the same. From 1996 to 1998, debit volume exceeded credit volume, but from 1999 to 
2004, credit volume exceeded debit volume. In 2005, volume for the two instruments has 
essentially been the same again. This may imply that, in Australia, credit and EFTPOS debit are 
relatively close substitutes and, hence, credit card networks and the EFTPOS network see each 
other as competitors. 
4.2.2  Intra-network competition 
Both the acquiring and issuing sides of the card market appear to be competitive in 
Australia. 
While the acquiring market is highly concentrated, a large portion of recent interchange 
fee reductions has been passed through to lower merchant service charges (MSC). The four 
largest banks in Australia acquire about 95 percent of transaction volume and 85 percent of 
transaction value.
20 However, according to the Reserve Bank of Australia, the average MSC for 
four-party networks in Australia has declined from 1.46 percent prior to regulation to 0.97 
percent since regulation. This roughly 50 basis point decline is in line with the decline in 
interchange fees pre- and post-regulation. 
                                                 
19Building Society Comments on RBA Draft Standards for Visa Debit and EFTPOS (April 29, 2005). 
20Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000)  
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Regarding credit card issuing, the four largest banks have a 55 percent market share in 
terms of number of cards and a 70 percent share in terms of transaction volume.
21 Although 
many banks reportedly have cut reward-program benefits as a response to lower regulated 
interchange fees, they still provide rewards to their cardholders. This may imply that a portion of 
interchange fee revenue remains passed through to cardholders, and that credit card issuing is 
competitive. Also indicative of competition is the fact that two of the four largest banks now 
issue and promote American Express cards as well as Visa and MasterCard cards. 
Regarding EFTPOS debit card issuing, the combined market share of the four largest 
banks is large. Issuers typically charge per-transaction fees to their cardholders after a certain 
number of free transactions. Issuers seem to compete by using the per-transaction fees and/or 
free-transactions as their strategic tools. 
4.2.3  Matching theory and practice 
As suggested above, the Australian payment card market probably can be characterized 
as exhibiting both network and intra-network competition. In light of this, which theoretical 
model(s) best “line up” with Australian interchange fee practices? 
None of the models appear to closely fit the Australian market over a large number of 
parameters. For example, competition between Visa and MasterCard, between Visa/MasterCard 
and Bankcard, and between credit cards and EFTPOS can all be characterized as four-party 
scheme network competition. Although the competition between Visa and MasterCard can be 
regarded as identical, the other two competitive relationships cannot. A number of important 
papers adopt four-party schemes, but all of them assume identical networks (Guthrie and Wright 
2003, 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2002, 2003). Chakravorti and Roson (2004) assume asymmetric 
network competition, but adopt either a three-party scheme or an issuer-controlled four-party 
                                                 
21Author’s calculation from Nilson Report.   
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scheme. EFTPOS cannot be regarded as issuer-controlled because interchange fees flow from 
issuers to acquirers in this market. (Note: On the other hand, competition between four-party 
scheme and three-party scheme may fit well with Maneti and Somma 2002.) And most 
importantly, of course, interchange fees are now regulated in Australia, which likely has 
fundamentally changed pricing dynamics. This “new regime” must be taken into account in 
analyzing current Australian conditions. 
Other factors to consider in addressing the Australian situation include differences in 
acquirer and issuer margins, merchant strategy, consumer cardholding, and surcharging. 
Acquirers appear to maintain a constant margin regardless of interchange fee levels, while 
issuers’ margins appear to be influenced by the level of interchange fees. Most models assume 
constant margins on both sides of the market; only Wright (2004) considers interchange fee pass-
through. 
Regarding merchant strategy, it is generally believed that the Australian retail industry is 
more concentrated than that in the United States. It is unclear, however, how competitive 
Australian merchants are in practice. Merchants likely have a strategic motive to accept cards. 
Unlike in the United States, each network sets a single interchange fee for a typical point-of-sale 
transaction, that is, interchange fees do not vary by industry. This implies that heterogeneous 
merchants face a single interchange fee, consistent with Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2005); 
Rochet and Tirole (2003); Chakravorti and Roson (2004), Schmalensee (2002); and Wright 
(2004). Regarding consumers, consumers typically pay an annual fee for credit cards with an 
interest-free period. To join a reward program, an additional annual fee is charged. Such 
endogenous cardholding with a fixed cost is assumed by Chakravorti and Roson (2004), Katz 
(2001), and Wright (2003).  
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Merchants were not allowed to surcharge prior to credit card reform. Since reform, 
surcharging has been permitted, but few merchants reportedly have elected to do so. According 
to a recent survey, however, nearly half of Australia’s merchants plan to apply surcharges to 
credit card transactions in 2006.
22 To sufficiently capture developments in the Australian 
payment card market, future models will probably need to explicitly assume the option of 
merchant surcharging as well as interchange caps for four-party schemes. 
4.3 United Kingdom 
4.3.1  Network competition 
It is unclear to what extent network competition exists in the UK. Whether the two 
dominant networks, Visa and MasterCard, compete against each other in both credit and debit 
markets, in just one market (likely debit), or whether Visa focuses on credit and MasterCard 
focuses on debit, is an open question. 
There are five credit card networks in the country. The two largest, Visa and MasterCard, 
together have a more than 90 percent market share.
23 In addition, the number of Visa and 
MasterCard credit/charge cards has been increasing in recent years, while the sum of those of 
other networks (American Express, Diners, and JCB) has not. Purchase values show the same 
trend (Chart 12). 
In the debit card market, the two networks, Visa and MasterCard, have essentially equal 
(50-50) market shares (Chart 13). A typical UK bank is a member of both the Visa and 
MasterCard networks, but in issuing debit cards banks choose one brand or the other. According 
to Cruickshank (2000), Switch’s (now MasterCard) interchange fee was considerably lower than 
Visa’s in 2000, suggesting that, on revenue grounds, Visa would be more attractive. However, 
                                                 
22See, for example, American Banker vol. 170, No. 148.  
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potentially offsetting this is the fact that MasterCard’s debit card, Maestro, is more popular 
throughout Europe. 
Two other facts make the UK card market interesting. First, unlike in most other 
European countries, debit cards have not markedly outstripped credit cards in terms of usage 
(Chart 14). Second, unlike in Australia, credit card-debit card network competition is subtle, if it 
exists at all, because there is no third network equivalent to EFTPOS. 
4.3.2  Intra-network competition 
Both the acquiring and issuing sides of the card market are competitive in the UK. 
The acquiring market is relatively concentrated: in 2002, the top two acquirers had 40 
percent and 30 percent market shares, respectively. However, it is likely that the market share of 
the top three acquirers has declined recently, and the difference between merchant service 
charges (MSCs) and interchange fees in the UK is comparable to the average difference in the 
United States.
24 
The issuing market is clearly competitive. With respect to credit cards, no annual fees, 
free or low introductory interest periods, and cash rebates are broadly used. In addition, several 
U.S. issuers, including Capital One, Citibank, and MBNA, have entered the UK market in recent 
years, and their combined market share now accounts for 20 percent of credit cards issued. 
Smaller UK banks have also entered the market (Table 8). With respect to debit cards, banks’ 
debit card market shares correspond closely with the current account market shares. 
                                                                                                                                                             
23European Payment Cards Yearbook (2004-5).  
24According to the 2002 MSC Survey by Payment Systems Europe Ltd, average credit card MSC in UK has been 
stable around 1.5-1.6% from 1995 to 2002. According to Cruickshank (2000), average credit card interchange fee 
was 1-1.1%. In the United States, reportedly average MasterCard and Visa credit card MSC is around 2% and 
average interchange fees is around 1.5%.   
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4.3.3  Matching theory and practice 
As noted above, the degree of network competition in the UK is difficult to gauge. Intra-
network competition, on the other hand, exists. 
To the extent Visa and MasterCard compete in the credit card market, it can be 
characterized as an identical four-party scheme (Guthrie and Wright, 2003, 2005; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2002, 2003). To the extent Visa and MasterCard compete in the debit card market, 
competition is again four-party, but it may or may not be identical network competition. 
According to Cruickshank (2000), Visa debit and Switch (MasterCard) interchange fees were 
quite different in 1998: the Visa debit interchange fee was at least twice as much as the Switch 
interchange fee. However, the more recent European Payment Cards Yearbook (2004-5) reports 
that the average interchange fee on Visa debit is thought to have fallen sharply from the figure 
reported in Cruickshank (2000). Depending on how close the two networks’ interchange fees 
now are, they may be regarded as almost identical. If they are not identical, Chakravorti and 
Roson’s (2004) asymmetric network competition model may fit well. Although their model 
assumes a three-party scheme, it can also accommodate an issuer-controlled four-party network. 
Since Visa debit issuers typically are not Switch issuers, an issuer-controlled four-party 
assumption may be valid. 
In terms of intra-network competition, it is hard to judge which side is more competitive 
or which side receives higher margins. However, in the UK, all networks are still subject to so-
called “net issuer rules”—only issuers can be acquirers. In addition, many aspects of merchant 
acquiring, such as transaction processing and recruitment of retailers, are outsourced to third-
party service providers who do not have voting power. Therefore, a network’s objective is likely 
to be weighted more on the issuer side. As a result, maximizing issuers’ profits, maximizing the  
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number of transactions, or maximizing a weighted sum of end-user surplus (with a higher weight 
on the consumer side) are plausible assumptions. These assumptions are made in Guthrie and 
Wright (2003, 2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003), with network competition; and in 
Wright (2003), Schwartz and Vincent (2004), and Schmalensee (2002), without network 
competition. 
There are additional factors to consider as well. One, although the degree of competition 
among merchants is unknown, merchants likely have a strategic motive to accept cards. If they 
did not, they may not have complained about credit card interchange fees to the Office of Fair 
Trading in the early 1990s. Two, credit and debit card interchange fee schedules are not publicly 
available. However, according to Cruickshank (2000), credit card interchange fees vary 
according to a number of factors, including whether a transaction is domestic or cross-border, 
whether it is a face-to-face or a mail order transaction, and on the level of information about the 
transaction that is provided to the issuer. Visa’s pricing in the UK may, therefore, be somewhat 
similar to Visa’s pricing for EU cross-border transactions and, unlike in the US, a single rate may 
typically apply to retail POS transactions in the UK. This implies that heterogeneous merchants 
largely face a single interchange fee, as assumed by Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2005), Rochet 
and Tirole (2003), Chakravorti and Roson (2004), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2004).  
Consumer factors to consider: Consumers can hold credit cards with no annual fees, so 
endogenous cardholding with no fixed fees might be an apt description in the UK credit card 
market (Guthrie and Wright, 2003, 2005; Gans and King, 2002). On the other hand, since the 
debit card is a demand deposit account product, debit card holding might be exogenous. 
Other factors to consider: UK merchants are prohibited from surcharging debit card 
transactions, but they are permitted to surcharge credit card transactions. However, most  
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merchants choose not to surcharge for credit card transactions; surcharging may require some 
costs to merchants. Thus, interchange fees are not neutral, unlike the Gans and King (2002) 
prediction.  
On balance, the assumptions in Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2005) appear to fit UK 
payment markets well if Visa and MasterCard compete against one another. The model predicts 
that under network competition and merchant competition, merchant heterogeneity may raise 
interchange fees if networks place more weight on consumer surplus than on merchant surplus. 
Since credit card reward programs are very popular in the UK, consumer surplus is likely 
weighted more heavily than merchant surplus. However, unlike the model’s prediction, UK 
credit card interchange fees have been declining. The decline in interchange fees may not be a 
result of market equilibrium but may be due instead to regulatory pressure from the Office of 
Fair Trading. 
If, on the other hand, Visa and MasterCard do not compete in the UK, none of the models 
closely match the UK market. However, one of Schmalensee’s (2002) key results—that under 
bilateral monopoly, the more weight the issuer has in the network’s objective function, the higher 
the interchange fee—may describe differences between credit and debit card interchange fees. In 
the UK, credit card interchange fees are higher than debit card interchange fees, and they are 
considered to be anticompetitive. The Schmalensee result may fit if credit card network members 
are close to a bilateral monopoly and debit card network members are more competitive. 
4.4 Netherlands 
4.4.1  Network competition 
Network competition appears to be limited in the Netherlands. The country has two credit 
card networks (Visa and MasterCard) and one debit card network (Interpay).  
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With respect to credit cards, MasterCard has a larger market share than Visa. This is true 
for both number of cards and overall (domestic plus foreign) transaction volume (Chart 15). 
Credit card usage in the Netherlands is quite low compared with debit card usage, however. 
Interpay is the sole debit card network. It is PIN-based. Its share in the total Dutch 
payment card network (credit plus debit) is 74 percent in terms of number of cards, 90 percent in 
transaction value, and 95 percent in transaction volume. In contrast with credit cards, Interpay’s 
transaction volume and value have been increasing in recent years (Chart 16). 
4.4.2  Intra-network competition 
It is difficult to gauge the degree of intra-network competition in the Netherlands. 
On the acquiring side, the Interpay network itself used to be the sole acquirer of PIN 
debit. However, acquiring contracts have recently been transferred to individual banks. Data are 
not available to determine whether merchant service charges have since declined.  
On the issuing side, until a few years ago, only one Dutch bank (Fortis) issued Visa credit 
cards, while the other major Dutch banks (as well as Interpay) issued only MasterCard credit 
cards. Today, several banks issue both brands, but credit card volume and value continue to be 
dwarfed by debit. Retail banking is highly concentrated in the Netherlands, with the top four 
banks accounting for 85 percent of Dutch current account market. As a result, concentration of 
debit card issuing is probably similarly high.   
4.4.3  Matching theory and practice 
Overall, the Schmalansee (2002), Wright (2004), and Gans and King (2002) models 
appear to best fit the Dutch card environment. All three are consistent with the lack of network 
competition. All three are also consistent with acquirers and issuers having some degree of 
market power. Although surcharging is allowed in the Netherlands, only a small fraction of  
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merchants actually surcharge. In addition, although the Dutch debit card market does not have 
explicit interchange fees, it had implicit ones at the time Interpay was the sole acquirer—
Interpay paid dividends to its owner financial institutions who were PIN card issuers. Today, 
acquiring contracts are made with individual acquirers and, thus, implicit interchange fees have 
disappeared. Introducing a positive interchange fee is currently being discussed in the 
Netherlands. 
5.  Summary 
This paper has sought to provide a bridge between the theoretical and empirical 
literatures on interchange fees. Specifically, the paper confronts theory with practice by asking, 
to what extent do existing models of interchange fees match up with actual interchange fee 
practices in various countries? For each of four countries—Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, 
and the United States—models that “best” fit the competitive and institutional features of that 
country’s payment card market are identified, and the implications of those model are compared 
to actual practices.  
Not surprisingly, the models examined—while certainly yielding insight into 
developments in these countries—are limited in their applicability and predictive power. This 
reflects the fact that country-specific factors are typically very important. The next step, of 
course, is to try to gather comprehensive data that capture these institutional features as well as 
interchange structures and prices, so that rigorous econometric analysis can be conducted.  
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Table 1: Credit Card 
1 234 5 67 8







































MC                                                              





Visa:collectively set by members of 
the network 
1. In column (4), four-party networks are listed above the line while three-party networks are listed below;
 "*
" denotes networks that issue cards to that 
country’s residents for international use and are available for foreigner’s use within the country
Declining
Stable
Annual Fees: Zero fees 
prevalent                         
Interest Rates: Zero 
introductory interest rates 












MC: collectively set by members of 
the network                                           
1% Stable
MC/Visa: aligned with MSCs, which 




Visa: collectively set by members of 
the network subject to regulatory 
agreement  
MC: collectively set by members of 




Annual Fees: Declining          
Interest Rates: Zero 
introductory interest rates 
prevalent                        
Rewards: Increasing
Canada 23%
MC/Visa:collectively set by members 
of the networks
MC: Increased    
Annual Fees: Increasing        
Interest-Free Period: 






MC/Visa:collectively set by members 
of the Mexican Bankers' Association 





Bankcard/MC/Visa: collectively set by 
members of the networks subject to 
regulatory limits






Recent Cardholder Fee 
Movements
Declined Declined
2. "nap" denotes not applicable
Declining
Region Country Share Networks
MC:set by management                  
Visa:collectively set by members of 





Table 1: Credit Card (cont.) 
12 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
                                                
Bankcard: No    Bankcard: Yes  
MC: No  MC: Yes  
Visa: No Visa: Yes
1.  Wal-Mart HAC case.
MC: No
Visa: Yes 3.  MasterCard's interchange fees under EC review.  
5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge rule.
1.  Agreements among banks, networks, merchants, 
and government agencies have led to reduction in 
interchange fees since 1999.  A further lowering of 
fees may result from an April 2005 ruling by the 
Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia.
2. There is some dissatisfaction with lack of 
transparency in fee setting. 
No
Yes/No




MC: No                    nap No
MC: No                    Spain
Visa: /Yes
Yes/No
MC: No                   
Visa: Yes
Europe

















Region Country HAC Net Issuer Duality/Exclusion
Debate over surcharging. nap
MC/Visa: Yes Yes/
MC: No Yes/No
MC: Yes 2. Banco de Mexico has made the HAC rule more 
flexible: merchants are allowed to accept only debit, 
credit, or both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule was left intact because 
discounts are already allowed.
MC: No
No-Surcharge
2.  Visa's no-surcharge and net issuer rules left 
intact by EC.
4.  Appearance of volume-based interchange fee 
tiers.
Yes/No
1. Reserve Bank of Australia regulations lowering 
credit card interchange fees and eliminating  credit 
card no-surcharge rules.                                              
No/ "Synthetic duality" for MC and Visa. MC: Yes
MC/Visa: Yes No 
1.  OFT has ruled that the 2000-2004 MC 
multilateral interchange fee agreements were anti-
competitive and is now investigating MC’s current 
arrangements.  
2. OFT has issued a statement of objections against 
Visa’s domestic multilateral interchange fee 
agreement. 
Issues 
2. In light of regulation of four-party schemes, 
potential shift in transactions volume to nonregulated 
three-party schemes.
1.  Visa agreement to reduce cross-border 
interchange fees.  
2. Merchant dissatisfaction with interchange fee 
levels.   
3. DOJ-led court case eliminating MC and Visa 
exclusion rules that prohibited member banks from 
issuing American Express and Discover credit cards. 
4. Exclusion provisions in Visa's membership rules 
under EC review.  
1. Interchange fees have been reduced due to a 




Table 2: Signature-Based Debit Card 
1 234 5 6 78





MC        
Visa
Denmark neg nap nap nap nap nap
Netherlands neg nap nap nap nap nap










Other Fees Interchange Fees Market Information
Recent MSC 
Movements
Recent Cardholder Fee 
Movements
Declined Declined 





MC/Visa: negotiated bilaterally 51%
+
Visa:collectively set by members of 
the network subject to regulatory 
agreement
MC:collectively set by members of 
the network   nap
MC:set by management                       
Visa:collectively set by members of 
the network     
13%
MC: set by S2 Card Services
MC/Visa:collectively set by members 
of the Mexican Bankers' Association 



























Net decline Net decline
4. "nap" denotes not applicable
3. "#" denotes share includes ATM transactions
1. 
"*
" denotes networks that issue cards to that country’s residents for international use and are available for foreigner’s use within the country
5. "neg" denotes negligible






Table 2: Signature-Based Debit Card (cont.) 
12 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Canada nap nap nap nap nap
1.  Wal-Mart HAC case. 
3.  MasterCard's interchange fees under EC review. 
5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge rule.
Denmark nap nap nap nap nap








Issues  No-Surcharge HAC Net Issuer Duality
3. Appearance of volume-based interchange fee 
tiers.  
Reserve Bank of Australia proposal to lower  
interchange fees and eliminate no-surcharge and 
HAC rules on Visa signature debit card.
Yes Visa: Yes nap
Yes
Yes
1. Interchange fees have been reduced due to a 
concerted effort between Banco de Mexico and the 
Mexican Bankers Association.
2. Banco de Mexico has made the HAC rule more 
flexible: merchants are allowed to accept only debit, 
credit, or both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule was left intact because 
discounts are already allowed.
Yes
4. Exclusion provisions in Visa's membership rules 
under EC review. 
1.  Agreements among banks, networks, merchants, 
and government agencies have led to reduction in 
interchange fees since 1999.  A further lowering of 
fees may result from an April 2005 ruling by the 
Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia.
2. There is some dissatisfaction with lack of 
transparency in fee setting. 
1.  Visa agreement to reduce cross-border 
interchange fees.      
2.  Visa's no-surcharge and net issuer rules left 
intact by EC. 
Yes
Visa: Yes






















2. Merchant dissatisfaction with interchange fee 
levels.
Yes




Table 3: PIN-Based Debit Card 






Mexico nap nap nap nap nap nap













MC                                               
Visa
Dankort                           
MC
Visa Dankort: set by regulation      
MC: Declined MC: Declined
Visa: Declined  Visa: Declined
Interpay 
MC*
Spain neg nap nap nap nap nap
MC
Visa




Interac: Zero       
Dankort:              
Zero to positive 
to zero
Visa: Declined  nap
Dankort:              
Zero to positive 
to zero   
MC: collectively set by members of 
the network
Visa: collectively set by members of 
the network subject to regulatory 
agreement  
Domestic/MC: set by network 
management    














Recent Cardholder Fee 





Canada 36% Interac: sets it at zero














Visa: collectively set by members of 
the network   
MC/Visa: negotiated bilaterally 
nap
Some banks charge per-
transaction fees
MC/Visa:aligned with MSCs, which 
are subject to regulatory cap
4. "neg" denotes negligible




" denotes networks that issue cards to that country’s residents for international use and are available for foreigner’s use within the country
3. "nap" denotes not applicable
Interpay: sets it at zero Interpay: Zero
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Table 3: PIN-Based Debit Card (cont.) 
12 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Mexico nap nap nap nap nap
1. Consolidation of PIN networks.  
3. Appearance of "PIN" (per-transaction user) fees. 
3.  MasterCard's interchange fees under EC review.
 5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge rule.
Spain nap nap nap nap nap
Network Rules
Reserve Bank of Australia proposal to lower 
EFTPOS interchange fees.
Visa: Yes nap Yes









Some discussions over efficacy of zero interchange 
system.
MC: No                   
4. Appearance of volume-based interchange fee 
tiers.
2. Interchange fees rising in apparent competitive 
response to high and rising signature-debit 















MC: No                   
Visa: Yes
MC: No                   
Visa: Yes
nap






2.  Visa's no-surcharge and net issuer rules left 
intact by EC.




1.  Visa agreement to reduce cross-border 
interchange fees.        
2. Issuers discussing possiblity of charging positive 
interchange fees for Interpay transactions.
2. The amendment reduced MSCs for MC and Visa 
PIN transactions.
1. The 2003 amendment to the Payments Act 
introduced positive interchange fees on Dankort chip 
PIN debit transactions from January 2005.  
Beginning March 2005, banks are prohibited from 
charging merchants interchange fees/MSCs for 
Dankort transactions; instead, banks are allowed to 
charge annual fees.  Surcharging for Dankort 
transactions has also been prohibited since March 
2005.
Switch and Solo consolidated into MasterCard 
(Maestro).
Yes
1.  NMa fined Interpay and member banks for 
"charging excessive rates"; objection process still 
underway.    
Yes Yes
MC: No                 
MC: No                  Yes
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Table 4: Public Authority Involvement  
Actions/Rulings Taken Actions/Rulings Pending





Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
2. OFT issues a statement of objections 
against Visa’s interchange fees including 
credit cards, deferred debit, and charge card 
transactions (10/05).
Netherlands
Agreements among banks, networks, 
merchants, and Minsistry of the Economy 
have led to reduction in credit card and 
signature debit card interchange fees since 
1999.
UK
Sweden Swedish Competiton 
Authority
A further lowering of fees may result from an 
April 2005 ruling by the Tribunal de Defensa 
de la Competencia.
Spain
2.  Exclusion provisions in Visa membership 
rules under investigation (08/04).
NMa fined Interpay and member banks for 
"charging excessive rates,"; objection 
process still underway (2004).
Servicio de Defensa de la 
Competencia (SDC), 
Tribunal de Defensa de la 
Competencia (TDC), both 
under Ministry of the 
Economy                            
Helps administer the Danish Act on Certain 
Payments (2000) and the amendment to the 
Act (2003).  The Act (2000) regulates MSCs, 
and allows for merchant surcharging.  The 
amendment (2003) mandated the 
introduction of a positive interchange fee on 
Dankort chip PIN debit transactions, and a 
reduction in MC and Visa PIN debit MSCs.
Netherlands Competition 
Authority (NMa)
In “Case No COMP/29.373, Visa 
International- Multilateral Interchange Fee,” 
Denmark
(i)Visa agreed to gradually reduce cross-
border interchange fees on credit card, 
signature debit, and PIN debit transactions 
by December 2007 and to publish these 
fees, and (ii) the EC stated that it had no 
grounds for prohibiting Visa's no-surcharge 












Reached a Consent Agreement with the 
principal members of Interac, which resulted 
in expanded representation on the Board, 
liberalization of network access rules, and 
removal of constraints on product innovation 
and price competition, including the removal 
of the prohibition against surcharging.




Won court case eliminating MC and Visa 
exclusion rules that prohibited member 
banks from issuing American Express and 
Discover credit cards (10/04).
USA
Europe
1. Following multiyear investigation, OFT 
issued a decision that MC’s  2000-2004 
interchange fee agreements restricted 
competition and infringed on competition law 
(9/05).
Competition Authority     
Agency  Actions/Rulings
Comision Federal de 
Competencia (Federal 
Competition Commissioin)





Table 4: Public Authority Involvement (cont.) 
Actions/Rulings Taken Actions/Rulings Pending
12 6 7 8 9
Bank of Canada 
Banco de Mexico









Limited interaction; Bank 
of England sits as an 
observer on joint 





Banco de Espana monitoring credit 




TDC and Banca de 
















Some interaction; ECB 
can play advisory role.
European Central 
Bank
1. Interchange fees have been 
reduced due to a concerted effort 
between Banco de Mexico and the 
Mexican Bankers Association.
2. Banco de Mexico has made the 
HAC rule more flexible: merchants are 
allowed to accept only debit, credit, or 
both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule was left 
intact because discounts are already 
allowed.
Competition Authority    
Central Bank           
Interaction Agency Actions/Rulings
Limited interaction.
Conducted joint study, 
“Debit and credit card 
schemes in Australia, a 
study of interchange fees 
and access,” October 
2000.
Limited interaction. 
2.  Bankcard, MC, and Visa lowered 
credit card interchange fees and 
began publishing interchange fee 
levels (10/03).
3. Payments between American 
Express and Diners Club and their 
bank parters will not be regulated; 
however, American Express and 
Diners Club will reword clauses in 
their merchant aggrements and 
publish average merchant service 
fees (02/05).
3. Proposed eliminating Visa credit 
card-signature debit card HAC rule 
(02/05).
4. Bank will review the standards for 





1.  MC, Visa, American Express, and 
Diners Club credit card no-surcharge 
rules eliminated (01/03).                       
1. Proposed lowering EFTPOS PIN 
debit interchange fees (02/05).
2. Proposed lowering Visa signature 
debit interchange fees (02/05).




Table 5: Key Assumptions and Results in Previous Literature 
Assumptions   Assumptions 
Network Intra-Network  End-Users  Network 
Competition 
Intra-Network 
Competition  Paper  Competition, Scheme, 
Objectives, IFs 
Competition, Pass-
through, Costs, Entities  Consumers Merchants 
Others 
Results 
1  2  3 4  5  6  7 8  9 




Katz (2001)  •Competition is not 
considered 
•4-party scheme 
•No assumption on the 
network objectives 
•Single IF 
•Issuers and acquirers are 
perfectly competitive 
•100% pass-through IF 
•Fixed costs for card 
issuing and per transaction 
cost for both issuing and 
acquiring sides 
•No assumption on entities 
•Endogenous cardholding 
and a fixed card fee is 
charged 
•The card provides no 
transactional benefits but it 
makes some transactions 
possible 
•Receive per transaction 
rebate 
•Elastic demand for goods 
•Monopolistic merchants 
•Homogeneous in card 
benefits 




•Under NSR, card is likely 










•Acquiring is perfectly 
competitive and issuers can 
be monopoly or symmetric 
Cournot oligopoly 
•100% pass-through IF on 
acquiring side 
•Fixed costs for card 
issuing and per transaction 
cost for both issuing and 
acquiring sides 
•Endogenous cardholding 
and a fixed card fee is 
charged 
•Heterogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Pay per transaction fee  
•Inelastic demand for 
goods 
•Monopolistic merchants 
and competing merchants 
according to Bertrand are 
considered 
•Homogeneous in card 
benefits 





•Without fixed card costs and 
fees, if merchants are 
monopolistic, NSR increases 
card demand; if merchants are 
competitive, both network and 
regulator is indifferent between 
surcharge and no-surcharge. 
•With fixed card costs, if 
merchants are monopolistic, 
surcharging makes no 
















•(Multiple IFs are 
possible) 
•Acquirers are identical 
and perfectly competitive 
and issuers are identical 
and collude in pricing to 
card users (competitive 
card issuers are considered 
in section 6) 
•100% pass-through IF on 
acquiring side 
•Exogenous cardholding 
(some fraction of 
consumers hold a card) 
•Cardholders use only 
cards and pay/receive per 
transaction fee/rebate  
•Elastic demand for goods 
•Monopolistic merchants 
• Homogeneous in card 
benefits 





•If rebates to card users are not 
feasible, NSR reduces total 
consumer surplus. 
•Card user rebates raise IF and 
total consumer surplus, but 
reduce cash users' surplus. 
No Network 
Competition 




Gans & King 
(2002) 






•Issuers and acquirers are 
competing perfectly or 
imperfectly (two-part 
pricing and linear pricing) 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
exist 
•Exogenous cardholding 
(possibly pay a fixed card 
fee) 
•Homogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Transactional benefits 
decrease as more 
transactions made by the 
card 
•Pay per transaction fees 
•Elastic demand for goods 
•Monopolistic merchants 
•Homogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Transactional benefits 
decrease as more 
transactions made by cards 
•Pay per transaction fee 





•Under NSR and linear pricing, 
the profit-maximizing IF 
increases as acquirer 
competition increases and issuer 
competition decreases. 
•Under the same condition, the 
cost-minimizing IF is 
independent of acquirer 
competition but decreases as 
issuer competition increases.  
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Table 5: Key Assumptions and Results in Previous Literature (cont.) 
Assumptions   Assumptions 
Network Intra-Network  End-Users  Network 
Competition 
Intra-Network 
Competition  Paper  Competition, Scheme, 
Objectives, IFs 
Competition, Pass-
through, Costs, Entities  Consumers Merchants 
Others 
Results 
1  2  3  4  5 6 7  8  9 
Schmalensee 
(2002) 




weighted joint profits 
(issuers likely hold  more 
voting power than 
acquirers) 
•Single IF 
•Both bilateral monopoly 
and multiple issuers & 
acquirers are considered 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
exist 
•Different entities in the 
case of bilateral monopoly 
and no assumption in the 
case of multiple issuers 
and acquirers 
•Cardholding and card 
usage are not distinguished 
(exogenous cardholding) 
•Consumer’s (partial) 
demand for transaction is 
decreasing in cardholder 
per transaction fee 
•No assumption on 
consumer demand for 
products 
•No strategic motive to 
accept cards 
•Merchant’s (partial) 
demand for transaction is 




•Under bilateral monopoly, the 
more weight the issuer has in the 
network's objective function, the 
higher the interchange fees. 
•Under bilateral monopoly, 
when consumer's and merchant's 
demands are identical, the 
necessary condition for profit 
maximization is satisfied when 
interchange fee is set to equalize 
issuer and acquirer unit costs. 
•If consumer's and merchant's 
partial demand for transactions 
are linear and have the same 
slope, and if acquiring side 
competes more intense than 
issuing side, it is profit 
maximizing to raise interchange 
fee above the output-maximizing 
level.  No Network 
Competition 
(cont.) 














issuers and symmetric 
acquirers 
•Pass-through IF is 
considered 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
exist 
•Exogenous cardholding 
with no costs (all 
consumers hold a card) 
•Card benefits are drawn 
from density function h 
•Per transaction fee 
(rebate) is charged 
(received) 
•Inelastic demand for 
goods 
•Both strategic merchants 
and monopolistic 
merchants are considered 
•Merchants in a given 
industry are homogeneous 
in card benefits but each 
industry has different card 
benefits, which is drawn 
from density function g 
•NSR 
•HAC 
•If higher interchange fees 
increase per-transaction profits 
to issuers more than they 
decrease per-transaction profits 
to acquirers, (pass-through costs 
to user fees is higher on the 
acquiring side than the issuing 
side), profit-maximizing IF is 
higher than out-put maximizing 
IF. 
•When merchants compete 
according to Hotelling model, 
and issuers and acquirers pass 
through costs at the same rate, 
profit-max IF will be higher than 
welfare-max IF iff the average 
transactional benefit over all 
those merchants who accept 
cards is lower than the fee they 
pay at the profit-max IF. 
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Table 5: Key Assumptions and Results in Previous Literature (cont.) 
Assumptions   Assumptions 
Network Intra-Network  End-Users  Network 
Competition 
Intra-Network 
Competition  Paper  Competition, Scheme, 
Objectives, IFs 
Competition, Pass-
through, Costs, Entities  Consumers Merchants 
Others 
Results 
1  2  3  4  5 6 7  8  9 









•4-party scheme (3-party 
scheme is also considered 
as an extension) 
•Maximize weighted sum 
of end-user surplus 
•Single IF in a network 
•Both issuing and 
acquiring are perfectly 
competitive 
•100% pass-through IF on 
both sides 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
•No assumption on issuing 
and acquiring entities 
•Endogenous cardholding 
(whether to hold two cards, 
one, or none) and no costs 
of holding a card 
•Card benefits are drawn 
from density function h and 
do not vary by network 
•Per transaction fee is 
charged 
•Inelastic demand for goods 
•Strategic merchants 
•Both cases where 
homogenous and 
heterogeneous in card 
benefits with a single IF 
are considered 




•Inter-system competition may 
raise IFs under competition 
among heterogeneous merchants 
(elastic merchant demand for 
transactions), and it may or may 
not reduce IFs under 
competition among homogenous 
merchants (inelastic demand up 











•No assumption on 
whether competing two 
networks are identical 
•4-party scheme 
•Maximize issuers’ 
profits = set highest IF 
that induces merchant 
card acceptance 
•(Multiple IFs are 
possible)   
•Acquiring is perfectly 
competitive and issuing 
involves some market 
power 
•100% pass through IF on 
acquiring side 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
•No assumption on issuing 
and acquiring entities 
•Cardholding and card 
usage are not distinguished 
(exogenous cardholding) 
•Card benefits are drawn 
from density function h (and 
do not vary by network) 
•Per transaction fee is 
charged 





•4-party scheme network 
competition has no impact on IF 
if consumers hold at most one 
card. Otherwise, it increases 
merchant resistance and thus 
lowers IFs. 
Competition 








•Competition between a 
not-for-profit network 
jointly run by members 
and a proprietary network 
•Networks compete 
according to the 
Hotelling model 
•Maximize total profits 
•Single IF 
•Per transaction margins to 
issuers and to acquirers are 
proportional to net costs 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
•Issuers and acquirers are 
different entities 
•Cardholding and card 
usage are not distinguished 
(make only one transaction) 
•A fixed card fee is charged 
(no per transaction fee) 
•Hold at most one card 
•Consumer’s taste for the 
network is uniformly 
distributed over an interval 
•Inelastic demand for goods  
•No strategic motives 
•A fixed fee is charged 
(not per transaction fee) 
•Merchants maximize their 
utility (not profits) 
•Merchant’s taste for the 
network is uniformly 
distributed over an interval 
 
•HAC •When  intra-network 
competition is symmetric (ratios 
of issuer’s and acquirer’s prices 
to their net costs are the same), 
equilibrium networks’ profits 
are independent of the 
interchange fee. 
•If acquirer’s margin (relative to 
the net costs) is greater than 
issuer’s, the proprietary 
network’s profit increases with 
the non-profit network’s 
interchange fee.   
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Table 5: Key Assumptions and Results in Previous Literature (cont.) 
Assumptions   Assumptions 
Network Intra-Network  End-Users  Network 
Competition 
Intra-Network 
Competition  Paper  Competition, Scheme, 
Objectives, IFs 
Competition, Pass-
through, Costs, Entities  Consumers Merchants 
Others 
Results 








joint profits = maximize 




issuers and symmetric 
acquirers 
•Per transaction margins 
to issuers and to acquirers 
are constant (and tend to 
be zero). 
•100% pass through IF 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and no fixed costs 
exist 
•No assumption on issuing 
and acquiring entities 
•Endogenous cardholding 
decisions (whether to hold 
two card, one card, or none) 
and no costs of holding a 
card 
•If consumers obtain 
positive intrinsic benefit 
from holding cards, 
multihoming is equilibrium, 
otherwise consumers hold at 
most one card. 
•Card benefits are drawn 
from density function h and 
do not vary by network 
•Pay per transaction fee 
•Inelastic demand for goods 
•Both strategic merchants 
and monopolistic 
merchants are considered 
•Both cases where 
homogenous and 
heterogeneous in card 
benefits with a single IF 
are considered 





competition may raise IFs if 
most merchants accept multiple 
cards and consumers typically 
carry a single card 
(heterogeneous merchants). 
•Greater inter-system 
competition may lower IFs if 
most consumers hold multiple 
cards and merchants will reject 
the more expensive card. 










•Both 4-party scheme and 
3-party scheme are 
considered 
•4-party schemes 
maximize the number of 
transactions and 3-party 
schemes maximize profit 
•Single IF 
•Per transaction margins 
to issuers and to acquirers 
are constant and the same 
for both networks 
•Both issuers and 
acquirers join only one 
network 
•100% pass through IF on 
both sides 
•Per transaction cost is 
fixed and with and 
without fixed costs are 
considered 
•No assumption on issuing 
and acquiring entities 
•Cardholding and card usage 
are not distinguished 
(exogenous cardholding) 
•Three types of 
consumers— 
marquee, captive, and 
multihoming—are 
considered 
•With and without fixed fee 
are considered (With a fixed 
fee, a consumer holds at 
most one card) 
•Heterogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Card benefits vary by 
network 
•Pay per transaction fee 
•Inelastic demand for goods 
•No strategic motives 
•Heterogeneous in card 
benefits with a single IF 




•Under identical association 
network competition, total fees 
charged across both sides = costs 
plus issuer and acquirer joint 
margin. 
•As more cardholders become 
multihoming, merchant fee 

















does not exist 
•Fixed costs for card 
issuing and per transaction 
cost for acquiring side 




and a fixed card fee is 
charged 
•Hold at most one card 
•Heterogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Card benefits vary by 
network 
•No per transaction fee 
 
•No strategic motives 
(each merchant sells an 
unique good) 
•Heterogeneous in card 
benefits 
•Card benefits vary by 
network 
•Pay per transaction fee 
and no fixed cost 
•NSR  •Total fees charged across both 
sides are always lower in 
duopoly than in monopoly 
network (symmetric 
competition). 
•Under asymmetric competition, 
a network with the lower 
consumer fixed fee always has 
the higher merchant per 
transaction fees.  
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Chart 1: US Credit Card Market 
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Source: Nilson Reports 
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Chart 2: US PIN Debit Card Market 
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Source: Nilson Reports  
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Source: Nilson Reports 
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Chart 4: US Signature-Based Card Acquiring Market 
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Chart 5: US Credit Card Issuing Market 
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Source: Nilson Reports  
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Chart 6: US Signature Debit Card Issuing Market 
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Source: Nilson Reports 
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Chart 7: US PIN Debit Card Issuing Market 
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Source: EFT Data Book 2003-2005 Editions 
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Chart 8: US Signature-Based Card Acquiring Market 
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Source: Nilson Reports  
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Table 6: Top Acquirers’ Ranks as Card Issuers 
 
Top 
Acquirers Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit 
1 4914
2 2 61 11 61 2 4 1
39 2 2
48 1 4
51 7 6 6
65 1 2 4 1 0
71 9
82 7 8 2
9 35 11 2 14 56
10 20 24
11 7 7 31 11
12 17 18 98
13 36 40
14 23 32 37 35 13
15 48 42 10
16
17 45
18 43 16 13 11
19 38
20 13 2 9
21 9
22 12 6 15 15
23 55
24 32 25 14
25 35 3 22 16
26 10 8
27 52
28 23 7 22
29 12













































Source: Nilson Reports 
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Table 7: US Interchange Category by Selected Brand 
 
Visa  MasterCard  Star 
Credit, Signature-Debit  Credit  Signature-Debit  PIN Debit 
Retail 
#,+  Merit III 
#,+  Merit III 
#    
Supermarket 
#,+  Supermarket 
#,+  Supermarket 
#  Grocery & Wholesale Club 
# 
Automated Fuel Dispenser 
+     Petroleum  Petroleum 
# 
Service Station 
+  Convenience 
+  Convenience    
Hotel & Car Rental 
+  Travel Industries +   Travel Industries     
Passenger Transport 
+  Passenger Transport  Passenger Transport    
Restaurant 
+     Restaurant    
Small Ticket     Small Ticket  Small Ticket 
Retail 2 (Emerging)     Emerging Markeet    
   Warehouse Club 
#,+  Warehouse Club 
#    
   Public Sector  Public Sector    
   Service Industries  Service Industries    
   Merit I 
+  Merit I    
         Medical 
         QS Restaurant 
         All Other Retailers 
# 
e-Commerce Basic 
+          
e-C Hotel & Car Rental 
+          
e-C Passenger Transport 
+          
e-C Retail 
+          
Standard  Standard 
+  Standard    
Electronic          
Card Not Present 
+          
Key Entry 
+  Key Entered 
+  Key Entered    
 
#: tiered fee structure 
+: varies by consumer credit card type 
 
Sources: Greensheets, Star 2005 Fee Schedule 
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Chart 10: Australia Credit Card Market 
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Note: Purchase value and transactions are the first half of the year each year. 











































Source: Reserve Bank of Australia  
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Sources: BIS, European Payment Cards 2004-5  
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Source: European Payment Cards 2004-5  
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Sources: BIS, European Payment Cards 2004-5  
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Table 8: UK Credit Card Market 















National Australia Group* 1.6  
 
*: foreign issuers 
#: including foreign issuers' portfolios 
 
Source: European Payment Cards 2004-5   
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Sources: BIS, European Payment Cards 2004-5  
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Source: BIS  
 
 